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Abstract 
A study was performed by the Construction Industry Research and Policy Center 
at The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, to identify causation for U.S. trench 
collapse fatalities in the construction industry that occurred during the years 1997-
1999. Of the 1217 fatality case files analyzed, 44 were categorized as trench 
collapse fatalities. The 44 trench collapse case files were analyzed and the 
contributed factors of the fatalities were identified in an effort to determine the 
causation of collapses. The results of the study showed a large number of trenches 
without any type of protective devices being used. The findings of the fatal 
trench collapse investigation events suggest the fatal events might have been 
prevented if there was compliance with OSHA regulations for protective devices 
in the trenches, training of employees, and having an OSHA trained competent 
person on site. 
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Preface 
This thesis is an expanded and revised version of a paper published in the journal 
American Journal of Industrial Medicine by J. Harold Deatherage, Lisa K. Furches, Mike 
Radcliffe, William R. Schriver, and John P. Wagner. 
Deatherage, J. Harold et al. (2004). "Neglecting Safety Precautions May Lead to 
Trenching Fatalities." American Journal of Industrial Medicine, June 2004. 45:522-527. 
My primary contributions to this paper included (1) aiding in the selection of the topic for 
research, (2) review of the fatality case files for the collection of the data, (3) most of the 
gathering and interpretation of the literature, (4) co-wrote the paper, (5) developed all 
tables and figures, and (6) co-analyzed the statistical data for conclusions. 
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I. Introduction 
OSHA conducts investigations of fatalities for two main purposes. The first is to 
support the issuance of citations on a case-by-case basis. The second reason is to collect 
data for a national fatality database, which is used to track trends and guide the 
intervention process. 
By tracking trends it was discovered that trench collapses rank, on average, as the 
fifth most frequent category of construction fatalities investigated by the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration during the 1991-2001 period (Schriver, 1993, 1994, 
1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002). 
While falls from elevations, run-overs by construction equipment and 
electrocutions were found to rank higher than trench collapses as categories of 
construction fatalities, there are two reasons why the understanding of trench fatalities 
may lead to cost-efficient intervention strategies. (1) Only workers in trenches (a very 
small percent of on-site work) were exposed to injury from trench collapse while many 
more construction workers were exposed to falls, electrocutions and run-overs by 
construction equipment; therefore, the number of workers requiring safety training would 
be quite small. (2) There were numerous causes of falls and electrocutions, while there 
were fewer and certainly more controllable causes of fatal trench collapses. 
History 
One of the few documented construction trades as well as one of the oldest in 
history was the trench digger. Prior to the 1950's all trenches were dug by hand and 
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shovel. Trenches could be found in construction work as well as warfare. Trenches were 
used in both World Wars to protect the soldiers that were on the front lines. These 
trenches were dug by hand and as they dug down deeper in the earth the workers/soldiers 
would use pieces of timber to shore or support the walls of the trench. 
Following World War II, the trench digger trade was quickly disappearing as an 
established profession with the new "cabled" backhoes, and later the hydraulically 
actuated backhoes. With the new high-powered backhoes, trenches could be dug quickly 
and efficiently. Since workers were not inside digging and shoring as they go, trench 
walls dug by the new backhoe were not shored or supported as often. 
Trenching also shows up in other professions and other points in history as well. 
Trenches are used in archeological digs to help determine where to dig, but the trenches 
are small and shallow and are rarely deep. The Romans also used trenches for the 
transport of water and were typically used along the sides of their roads to keep water 
from collecting. Thus, trenching is a well-established activity in the construction 
industry. 
Purpose 
The goal of this study is the analysis of the fatal trenching accidents, in United 
States during 1997-1999, to determine why fatalities are occurring. The direct cause of 
the fatality and the contributing physical and organizational factors are examined to 
determine the effect on the accident. While examining the accidents, the usefulness of 
the Integrated Management Information System (IMIS) database is assessed. The case 
files and IMIS are both used to compare the result and gather additional information. 
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II. Background of Trenches 
There is a balance of the forces acting within the earth's soil, by the pressure of 
the soil's weight acting downward and the horizontal confinement support from the 
surrounding soil. Trenching removes some of the horizontal confinement and disturbs 
the balance, resulting in a net increase in horizontal force toward and into the trench 
opening. The internal soil strength, tries to resist this pressure (Matheson and Naylor, 
1997). The balance of forces can be greatly affected and disturbed by simple vibrations, 
large weight on the edge of the trench, cracks in the soil, and moisture content. The soil 
strength, or stability, is classified using a soil classification system based on an analysis 
of the soil's properties and performance characteristics. One important property is the 
soil's cohesiveness, or the ability of the soil sticking together. 
OSHA classifies soils into four categories in a decreasing order of stability: 
Stable Rock, Type A, Type B, and Type C. A solid/stable rock trench is typically not 
found because to trench into rock takes drilling or blasting. When the drilling or blasting 
is done it normally causes cracks in the rock and can make it less stable. 
Type A soil is the one step down from stable rock and can be composed of silt 
clay or sandy clay. Soil cannot be classified as A if it has cracks, is subject to vibrations 
(from cars, pile drivers, etc.), has been previously excavated, is layered soil (which is less 
stable at the bottom), or there is water, and freezing or thawing conditions. 
The soil categorized as Type B can include both cohesive and non-cohesive soil. 
Typically if a soil is typed B, it's a Type A soil but has either cracks or is subjected to 
vibrations. The soil can consist of silts, sandy loams, medium clays, and unstable rock. 
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Type C is the least stable and can be easily typed, because of the soil sloughing or 
rolling into the trench. It can consist of any type of soil mix and often has standing water 
or very high moisture content. It also can be overly dry and crumbly. It is critical for a 
competent person onsite to classify soil type correctly because soil type is a determining 
factor in specifying a protective system for trench work. For soil to be typed correctly a 
competent person trained by OSHA needs to examine it and continue examining it 
throughout the duration of the project. A trained person uses two types of tests to judge 
the soil, a visual test and a manual test. A visual test can include inspecting the soil as it 
is being removed and examining the spoil pile, the soil removed from the dig, and the 
color and make-up of the excavation walls. A manual test means working with the soil 
with either your hands or with an instrument designed to measure soil strength. For 
example, if you can roll the soil in your hand into a long worm or ribbon, the soil is 
cohesive and many be classified as A or B, depending on the conditions. 
(www.afscme.org) But the prudent practice for trenching soil types, if a person is 
uncertain of the type, then always assume Type C and plan for the best protection 
available. 
Trenches between five feet and twenty feet require acceptable protective measures 
to protect the workers in the trench. Acceptable protective measures can consist of 
shoring and sheeting, shielding, sloping, and/or benching. The layout, project, soil, and 
characteristics of the trench are used to determine the correct level of protection. If the 
depth of the trench is greater then twenty feet a registered professional engineer is 
required to design the protective system in the trench. Shoring involves installing a 
structure, such as a metal hydraulic or timber system that presses tightly against the 
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trench wall to prevent cave-in while shielding provides a sheltered space for the 
employees to work. Sheeting is another shoring method that keeps the earth in place. 
The sheeting can be driven into the ground for added support for the trench sides. Driven 
sheeting is typically used when a trench is left open over a long period of time. Trench 
boxes, or sometimes called shielding, are another common protective system used in 
trenching (Figure 1 and 2). Trench boxes are typically used when a long trench is needed 
( an example would be installing sewer/water lines). Trench boxes can be dragged along 
the trench as the work is completed while continuing to protect the workers. Below are 
some commonly accepted practices that need to be followed but are typically overlooked: 
• All personnel should be out of the trench box and out of the excavation when the 
shield is being moved. If not, a person could be caught between the moving box 
and a fixed object, like a pipe. 
• The top of the shield ( or trench box) should extend at least eighteen inches above 
the level of the trench. If it doesn't, material that was excavated could cave or roll 
into the trench. 
• Some trench boxes are designed to be stacked on top of one another. Never stack 
boxes that are not designed for that purpose, and do not stack them from different 
manufacturers, as they may not be compatible and could fail if a collapse occurs. 
• The forces of a cave-in can push a trench box sideways, causing a hazard to the 
workers in the trench. After a box is positioned, the voids between the box and 
the trench wall should be filled with excavated material to prevent movement of 
the box during a cave-in. 
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Figure 1-10 X 16 Single Wall Steel Trench Box 
Figure 2 - Example of a Trench Box in Use 
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• Shielding, trench boxes, sheeting, and shoring equipment should always be used 
according to manufacturers tabulated data. 
• Workers should never leave the confines of the sheeting, shielding, or trench box. 
Collapses can happen very quickly and without any warning. 
(www.afscme.org) 
Sloping is a technique used to cut the walls at angles; this reduces the forces 
placed on the soil, which can cause collapses. The cut of the angle or "angle of repose," 
as it is typically called, differs depending on the type of soil. For Type A soil each foot 
in depth, the trench needs to be sloped back at least half a foot (Figure 3). Type B soil 
needs to sloped back at least ¾ of a foot for each foot in depth (Figure 4 ), and Type C at 
least a full foot and a half sloped is required (Figure 5). If the sloping meets all the 
correct dimensions then the trench meets the standards set by OSHA. 
20'Max. 
Figure 3 - An Example of a Sloped Trench for Type A Soil 
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Figure 4 - An Example of a Sloped Trench for Type B Soil 
-·· L} 
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Figure 5 - An Example of a Sloped Trench for Type C Soil 
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Benching (Figure 6) is a similar technique to sloping, in that the walls of the 
trench are cut back. But instead of cutting the walls at angles, benching cuts the walls 
into 90-degree angles or steps. It uses the same slope requirements needed in sloping with 
maximum step height of 5 feet and width at 4 feet. 
Stable excavating occurs when soil movement is limited by methods to reduce the 
lateral stress at the excavation opening such as shoring, sloping, or shielding. The 
stability of the trench is affected by many factors including: an increase in depth of cut, 
change in soil water content, unstable or previously disturbed soil, surface cracks near the 
excavation face, shock or vibration, changes in weather, and the weight and proximity of 
excavated soil (Matheson and Naylor, 1997). 
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Figure 6 - An Example of a Benched Trench for Type B Soil 
(Other soil types are constructed similarly) 
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Figure 7-Example of Soil Weight (Mickle, 1991) 
During a trench failure, the walls collapse suddenly with little or no time for the 
worker to react. A small amount of dirt falling on a worker does not seem so treacherous, 
but a single cubic yard of dirt can weigh over 2,700 pounds and could reach up to 4,000 
pounds for some types of soil and moisture content (Figure 7). This is equivalent to the 
weight of a small pick-up truck. The weight of this soil can crush the body, which can 
cause death in a matter of minutes (Hayslip, 2002). 
Because of the dangers involved, OSHA requires a competent person onsite on a 
I daily basis that has a thorough knowledge of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR 
1926.650-652/ Subpart P). See Figures 8 and 9 for examples of unsafe trenching 
conditions. This competent person should understand how to classify soil types, know the 
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Figure 8 - Example of a Trench without Protection 
Figure 9 - An Example of Trench without any Protection and 
Numerous Other Hazards 
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different types and proper use of safety equipment, and have the ability to recognize, 
prohibit, and correct unsafe conditions (www.afscme.org). 
Common Myths of Trenching 
In trench collapses there are always "tall tales" or myths. These myths are often 
believed because people can be afraid of the real truth. One such "tale" is the belief that 
if the trench starts to collapse I can out run the soil before it gets me. If dirt is falling 
only a distance of 10 feet, it can be moving 25 feet per second, or a little over 17.5 mph. 
Another myth is the belief that I can tie a rope around my waist and if the trench 
collapses the rescuers can find me. This is somewhat true; the rescuers could find you, 
but not in time. A person can suffocate in only 4 to 6 minutes when buried in a trench, 
and under the best rescue conditions, e.g. removing 2 cubic feet of dirt every minute, it 
could typically take 15 minutes to rescue a victim. An additional myth is that a backhoe 
can easily save somebody in a few seconds if the trench collapses. Possibly true, but one 
miscalculation and the backhoe could really cause some serious injuries to the victim. 
Lastly, is the belief that a trench can smell "funny" or the dirt can smell peculiar just 
before a cave-in. Unfortunately, there is not an olfactory indication before a trench 
collapses (Rekus, 1992). 
OSHA and Trenches 
In September 1985 OSHA announced a special emphasis program for 
enforcement of the existing trench and excavation standard, and in April 1987 issued a 
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Notice of Proposed Rulemaking announcing that OSHA intended to revise the standard 
(OSHA, 1987). This update was recognized as being needed because of the hazardous 
conditions in trenches as well as the numerous injuries and fatalities. OSHA believed an 
update of the standard would bring awareness and attention to safety and would decrease 
injuries and fatalities. Viscusi reported that during the 1970's OSHA enforcement had no 
effect on injury rates (Viscusi, 1979). A later analysis for 1973 to 1983 found that OSHA 
inspections resulted in a 2 to 3% decline in injury rates (Viscusi, 1986). It has long been 
thought if the guidelines, e.g. if trench boxes ( or sloping) are used, then the fatally level 
would be greatly decreased. The majority of the deaths in trenches were where protective 
measures, such as sloping or shoring, were not properly implemented. After a new 
standard was adopted at the beginning of 1990, Dr. Anthony Suruda conducted a study to 
determine the effect that the new standard had on the construction industry. Suruda 
examined the five years before the new standard and five years after the adoption. There 
was a 2-fold decline in the rate of fatal injury after the revision of the standard, which 
substantially exceeded the decline in other causes of fatal injury in the construction 
industry during the same period (Suruda, 2002). Unlike in the past, OSHA' s new 
standard did aid in the decrease of fatalities. However, the question still exists as to why 
were trenching fatalities are still occurring? Over the next five years after Suruda' s 
study, the trenching fatality rate compared to the total construction fatalities was fairly 
consistent (Table 1). Suruda's study proved that OSHA's new guidelines decreased the 
fatalities, yet fatalities over the next five years (after his study) have not decreased. 
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Table 1: 
Trenching Fatality Rate vs. Total 
Construction Fatality Rates 
(Schriver, 1996-01) 
Year Percent Rank 
1995 3.70% 11 
1996 5.40% 7 
1997 4.10% 8 
1998 3.80% 10 
1999 4.10% 12 
The intent of this work is to take the next step and try to determine if the trenching 
fatalities have any pattern, or if there were violations that may have led to the events. So 
the main question is asked, what is causing the fatalities in trenches? 
OSHA issues citations during surprise inspections, and also as a result of fatality 
investigations. OSHA uses these citations as a way to penalize the employers for not 
following the safety guidelines. Normally the financial penalty is commensurate with the 
seriousness of the violations. OSHA classifies four levels of violations, Willfut Repeat, 
Serious, and Other. A Willful violation is only assigned when it is clear that the 
employer has complete knowledge of the safety standards he was breaking, but 
performed the construction work anyway. A Repeat violation is where an employer has 
been previous cited for the same safety standard violation. A Serious violation, which are 
the most common issued, are assigned anytime a safety standard is broken. This level 
can be issued when the employer is unfamiliar with the standard or did not know they 
were breaking a standard. The "Other" level of violation is a less serious violation. 
These are "lesser safety standards" and are typically reporting or paperwork violations. 
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The financial penalties associated with the violations can depend on many factors, 
including the size of the company (number of employees), the history of the company's 
violations, and the good faith of the company. A good faith reduction can be assigned 
depending on "how willing" the employer is to change for future safety. The size 
reductions typically range from 10  to 75% depending on the company, where history is a 
10% drop if the company has not had a violation in the past 3 years and typically good 
faith is a 1 5% reduction. 
Violations are one of the techniques OSHA uses to convince or help force 
companies into compliance. Despite the increased OSHA emphasis on safety standards 
enforcement in the mid-80' s, open trenching contractors continued to dominate the 
construction industry in OSHA standards violations. In a 1 995 OSHA report listing the 
100 most frequently cited OSHA construction safety violations, open trenching rated in 
the top five (Anonymous, 2001). The situation has not changed and the violations for 
trenching still rank very high. According to the 2001 OSHA Industry Report: Open­
trenching has the highest number of OSHA safety violations of all heavy construction 
industries . . .  Further, open trenching leads all of the above (all US occupations) in dollar 
volume of assessed penalties by OSHA (Anonymous, 2001 ). So they are high in dollar 
as well as having a large number of violations. 
The National Database 
The Integrated Management Information System (IMIS) database is a collection 
of fatality investigations that OSHA has maintained on each fatal event. This national 
database consists of data from OSHA Forms (Appendix D}, completed by inspectors 
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during investigations. The information in the database contains information on the 
employer, the victim, accident, and the construction project. 
The employer data contains the company name, location of the company, 
violations associated with the accident, number of employees, and the Standard 
Identification Code (SIC) number. The SIC number is used to identify the normal work a 
company does. For example, a painting contractor (1720) would have a different SIC 
number then an excavation contractor (1794). 
The victim data will contain the sex, age, occupation, and task of the victim. The 
occupation and task differ in that occupation is what a person normally does, where the 
task asks if, when the victim died, was this their normal task or was this a new job for 
them. 
The accident data will have the operation the victim was performing, contributing 
operation, the fatality cause, and a brief narrative ( description of the event). The 
difference between the operation the victim was performing and contributing operation is 
that the contributing could have nothing to do with the victim's operation. An example 
would be a carpenter is cutting a piece of wood for framework on a new residential 
house, when the roofers on the roof drop some shingles on his head. The operation 
would be carpentry with a contributing operation of roofing. 
The last collection of data in IMIS is the project data. The project data will 
include the end use of the project, the project type, and cost of the project. The end use is 
a code given to the project by its definition of what the finished construction will be. 
Hotels, residential houses, waterlines, and excavations are all examples of different end 
use codes. The project type is different from the end use in that it asks if the project is 
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new construction, an addition, an alteration, or demolition work. The project type can 
normally be easily identified. 
With all this data in one central location, it can be used to identify trends and 
track fatalities in various construction projects and the different construction operations. 
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III. Methods 
Since 1991, the Construction Industry Research and Policy Center (CIRPC) at 
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, has analyzed the causes of fatal incidents in the 
construction industry for the Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) 
using "investigation-collected data" (Schriver, 1993-2001). CIRPC has analyzed this 
data in an effort to identify and rank the leading fatal operations in construction, assist 
OSHA in identifying factors that contribute to fatal incidents, and suggest intervention 
strategies aimed at preventing similar types of incidents. The CIRPC recently completed 
a review of 1997-1999 fatality cases files provided by OSHA area offices. The review 
centered on the information in the cases, the correctness of the national database, and to 
discover any trends of the fatalities in the construction industry. Two principal sources of 
"investigation-collected data" were used in this study: the IMIS database data entered 
from the OSHA Form 170 (Investigation Summary), and the case files (Case files exact 
content is varied but typically includes: OSHA forms 1 (Inspection Report), IA  
(Inspection Narrative), lB  (Worksheet), 2 (Citation & Notification of Penalty), and 36  
(Fatality/Catastrophe Report), along with field notes, photographs, police reports, 
interviews, newspaper clippings, autopsies, and sketches) that document OSHA's 
investigations of the fatal incidents. OSHA' s Office of Statistics maintains the IMIS 
database. 
To assist in the review and coding of the cases, a checklist (Figure 10) was 
created. CIRPC only reviewed the fatal incidents in Federal Planned States (See Table 
2). 
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Table 2: 
Federal and State Planned States 
Federal Planned States State Planned States 
AL MS AK NM 
AR MT AZ NC 
co ND CA OK 
CT NE HI OR 
D.C. NH IN SC 
DE NJ IA TN 
FL NY KY UT 
GA OH MD VT 
ID PA MI VA 
IL RI MN WA 
KS SD NV WY 
LA TX 
ME WI 
MA WV 
MO 
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1. Check Activity Number (Make sure it matches file) 
2. Check Event Date (Make sure it's the right year) 
3. Check Company Name 
4. Check the Degree, only accept a Degree of 1 
5. Check State (Do not accept states Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, 
6. Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New 
7. Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
8. Utah, Vermont, Virgin Islands, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming) 
9. Check the SIC Number, accept only construction 
10. Check Occupation 
11. Check or Re-code End Use Code 
12. Check or Re-code Project Type Code 
13. Check or Re-code Construction Operation Codes 
14. Check or Re-code Fatality Cause (Direct Cause) Codes 
15. Do not accept any natural cause deaths (i.e. Heart Attacks) 
16. Do not accept any drug related deaths 
17. Remove any Duplicate Files 
18. Check Day of the Week and Time of Day 
19. Check Contributing Causes 
20. Check Soil Type and Depth of Trench 
21. Check Age of Victim 
Figure 10: 
Check list for Federal Data File Review 
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fatality. The contributing factors were then graphed and charted to determine the leading 
causes and discover any trends in the data. 
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IV. Data and Results 
After reviewing all the case files, the results of: victim's occupation, age, 
contributing physical and organizational factors (the little factors that may have aided in 
the accident), day of the week, time of day, trench dimensions, types of protective 
devices used, soil conditions, and citations were analyzed. The direct cause of each of 
the 44 fatal events was by definition, crushing or suffocation, due to the physical collapse 
of trenches in which the victims were working. 
The occupations of the majority of the victims were laborers (See Appendix A, 
Figure. A-1) and their ages ranged from 25 to 34 (Figure. A-10). Figure A-10 shows the 
comparison of the Annual Age Average in the Construction Industry for 2001 reported by 
Current Population Survey (CPS) with the age breakdowns of all construction fatalities 
and trenching fatalities. When comparing this age data with the Current Population 
Survey's (CPS) Annual Age Average (Figure A-9) for the Construction Industry, there 
was a similarity between the total ages for each category (www.bls.census.gov/cps). 
Figure A-2 shows the frequency of the presence of contributing physical and 
organizational factors that may have contributed to either the collapse itself or the 
collapse resulting in a fatality. In 52 percent (23) of the fatal cases there was no training 
provided on safety procedures for trenching, and in 48 percent (21) of the cases no 
competent person was present at the work sites. There were eight other contributing 
physical and organizational factors which contributed to the trenching fatalities: 41 
percent (18) of the cases had spoil piles within two feet of the trench edge; in 30 percent 
(13) of the cases known procedures/training/warnings were disregarded; in 30 percent 
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(13) of the cases there was a failure to conduct safety walks (or daily inspection); in 25 
percent (11) of the cases there was no written procedures for trenching/excavation; in 21 
percent (9) of the cases safety rules were not likely to have been known; in 21 percent (9) 
of the cases there was an improper classification of soil types or required sloping 
specifications. 
Table 3 indicates the most frequently cited violations of OSHA's trenching 
regulations. The top citied OSHA violation was the lack of protection (benching, 
sloping, shoring, trench box, etc.) of employees in excavations (1926.652(a)(l )). The 
second highest was the lack of daily inspections of excavations by a competent person 
(1926.651(k)(l )). OSHA requires a competent person to inspect the trench site often to 
check for possible dangers. Instructing employees in recognition and avoidance of 
unsafe conditions (1926.21(b)(2)) was the next highest. This requirement was violated 
when employees have not been trained in the recognition of a dangerous situation. The 
fourth highest was the violation of materials and equipment that are within two feet from 
edge of the trench (1926.6510)(2)). Lastly, the lack of means of egress from a trench 
(1926.651(c)(2)) ranked the fifth highest. OSHA requires a ladder for the safe entrance 
and exit out of a trench. 
Figure A-3 shows the trenching fatalities broken down by the day of the week. 
Each day showed a similar total, except for a drop on the weekends. OSHA found that 
fatalities were spread proportionately among: 1)  the days of the week, 2) union and 
nonunion sites, 3) age groups, 4) various size companies, and 5) federal plan and state 
plan sites (OSHA, 1991 ). 
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TABLE 3: 
Leading Citations for Trench Fatalities Inspected by OSHA, 1997-1999 
Citation Frequency Percent Cited 
t29 CFR 1926.652(a)(l): failure to provide adequate 29 65 .9% tprotection (benching, sloping, shoring, trench box, etc.) 
129 CFR 1926.651(k)(l): failure to conduct daily 23 52.3% ltnspections of excavations by a competent person 
129 CFR 1926.21(b)(2) : failure to instruct employees 17 38.6% !With respect to recognition and avoidance of unsafe 
t29 CFR 1926.65l(j)(2): materials and equipment were 16 36.4% olaced within two feet from edge of the trench 
29 CFR 1926.651(c)(2): failure to provide adequate 12 27.3% means of egress from trench 
29 CFR 1926.l00(a): failure to require/enforce the use 6 13.6% of head protection by employees in trench 
129 CFR 1926.651(h)(l): failure to provide sufficient 3 6.8% !Water drainage from trench 
29 CFR 1926.651(j)(l): failure to protect employees 3 6.8% from loose soil or rock in excavations 
29 CFR 1926.20(b)(2): failure to establish and maintain 
a safety program requiring frequent inspections of job 3 6.8% 
sites, material and equipment by a competent person 
t29 CFR 1926.651(k)(2): failure to remove employees 
from unsafe excavation when hazard condition was 3 6.8% 
recognized by competent person 
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The depth of the trench data showed a large number of fatalities in the 5 to 9 foot 
range with fewer fatalities, as the depths got deeper. Two other notable details observed 
were a large number of the trench collapses occurred during the 11 :00 am to 1 :59 pm 
time period (Figure A-4), and the soil type was typically tested as Type C (Figure A-6). 
Figure A-5 shows that 66 percent (29) of fatal events might have been avoided if, 
proper shoring, sloping or benching, had protected the excavation. Figure A-5 also 
shows that 20 percent (9) of the fatal events were due to inadequately designed or 
selected protections. In 11 percent ( 5) of the cases the victim left the protected area and in 
2 percent ( 1) of the cases the victims were in a trench box but crushed by a pipe 
( displaced by the collapse) and the inner trench box wall. 
The trenching fatalities OSHA violation levels were also broken down for each 
case file. The largest group was the Serious level with 143 citations followed by Willful 
with 16 citations {Table 4). 
Table 4: 
Trenching Violation Data 
Level Number of Citations 
Serious 143 
Willful 16  
Repeat 
Other 2 
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The trenching fatalities sorted with respect to the companies total employment 
(Figure A-11) showed a large number of fatalities occurring in companies with 1 to 25 
employees (31 fatalities) and companies with 26 to 100 employees ( 11 ). 
The total dollar amount for all the trenching citations associated with the 
violations was over $930,000 with a range of $3,000 to $153,450, and an average of 
$21,000 per fatality. The OSHA violation history (Figure A-13) showed 12 (of 44) cases 
of the company having a previous history of violations with OSHA, where 26 ( of 44) 
cases did not. 
Only 3 victims (7%) were union members where 41 (93%) were not members of a 
collective bargaining agreement (Table 5). 
Table S: 
Trenching Fatalities by Union Member 
Classification 
Not a Union Member 
Union Member 
Percent 
93 .2% 
6.8% 
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V. Analysis and Discussion 
The top three categories of occupations of the victims of trench collapses were 
laborers (32), plumbers (6), and pipe layers (4). The laborers typically could be 
described as the least skilled ( or the "new guy"). Many of them might feel that the 
conditions are not safe, but might not have been properly trained to recognize the 
hazards. It also isn't a surprise that plumbers and pipe layers were the next two highest 
occupations. These two occupations typically work in trenches more often then others. 
Thus, if these occupations were commonly found in trenches, then it would be common 
for them to be involved in more fatalities. Perhaps this number is lower than laborers 
because plumbers and pipe layers typically have more training and maybe more familiar 
with the dangers of a trench. 
Figure A-9 shows the comparison of the age averages of all construction fatalities, 
trenching fatalities, and the total of all employees in the construction industry in 2001 (it 
is assumed the total would not greatly change from 1997-99 to 2001 ). The construction 
fatalities age and the annual age average for 2001, showed a very consistent comparison 
that was very close to equal in percentage. The trenching fatalities for the age group 16-
19 showed twice as many fatalities and may be caused by the inexperience of their age 
and construction work experience. They were fairly new to construction work and may 
not be aware of the dangers of a trench collapse. The 25-34 age category was higher 
because a large number of the construction work force is in this age range. 
The contributing physical and organizational factors of a trench collapse were 
typically indirect causes that would not directly cause the accident, but may have aided it 
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in occurring. The number one factor was the lack of training provided for trenching. It is 
important to point out that ten of the fourteen different factors are violations of an OSHA 
regulation. If OSHA regulations and training of the employees had occurred, then many 
of the contributing physical and organizational causes would not be factors and may have 
prevented the fatality from occurring. 
The leading citation for trenching fatalities was the lack of trench boxes, 
benching, sloping (29). Performing trench excavation without a diligent, trained, 
"competent person" (the second highest with 23 cases) exposes employees to risk of 
injury or death. If the employer had trained the employees (the third highest citations 
with 17 cases) many of the accidents may have been prevented. Trained employees may 
recognize the hazards and dangers of the worksite and many accidents may be prevented. 
The article from Concrete Products, "OSHA Conducts Study of Construction 
Fatalities," (Hayslip, 2002) showed that fatalities were spread proportionally through the 
days of the week. This was found to be true for this study for the regular work week 
(Monday thru Friday), but it did show a large decrease during Saturdays and Sundays. 
This would be expected because there is less construction work occurring during the 
weekends. 
The trenching fatalities, by the time of the day, showed a very large number of 
accidents during the 11 :00 am to 1 :59 pm time period, where the rest of the times were 
fairly consistent. It is typically believed that the longer a trench stays open the greater the 
likelihood of it collapsing. It is also believed the mid-day sun (if the day is sunny) can 
heat up/bake/dry out the trench to the point where it becomes crumbly and less cohesive. 
While it is not known if these factors can explain the reason for the increase during this 
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time periods, it is known that each factor can definitely affect the stability of a trench and 
may be the explanation. Anytime the soil type changes moisture content, the odds of a 
collapse are greatly increased. 
The depth of the trench involved in fatality showed a large number of collapses 
(20) in the 5 to 9 feet depth. The most likely reason for so many deaths in the 5 to 9 feet 
range was because there are more trenches dug at this depth than other depths. It could 
be assumed the total number of fatalities in each category may be proportional to the total 
number of trenches dug (in each category) for all construction over a certain time period. 
The direct causes of trench collapses can be defined as the leading factor that 
caused the fatality. There only needs to be one of these factors and it can lead to an 
employee's death, where the contributing physical and organizational factors only aided 
(and many of them could occur simultaneously) and the trench would not necessarily 
collapse. The leader, by far, of the direct causes was the lack of a trench box, shoring, or 
sloping (29 cases). Again 39 of the fatalities cases (no sloping/benching/shoring and 
inadequately design/selected protection) could have been prevented, if the contractor had 
followed OSHA regulations. The last direct cause (workers left the protected area) was 
postulated to be related to the lack of employee training. It is noteworthy that all of the 
top factors indicated a failure to comply with OSHA regulations for trenching. 
If the soil type is unknown, then the best management practices would be to 
assume the worst case or the Type C soil type level of protection. The trenching fatalities 
by soil type showed a combined 39 soil types of Type C (assuming unknown is C). Type 
B was only typed in 5 fatality cases, even though it's  a slightly more cohesive soil, it still 
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needs a certain level of benching/shoring. There were no cases of Type A soil or Stable 
Rock. 
The number of employed workers by the company showed that 75% percent of all 
the trenching fatalities occurred in companies with 1 to 25 employees. The larger 
companies did not have as many fatalities. There were only two fatalities with 
companies with over 100 employees. The larger companies were more likely to have a 
safety program as well as a safety department with a director. The smaller companies 
could be the "ma and pa" type businesses and may not have a safety director or 
department because of the added expense. 
OSHA violation history showed 26 cases that did not have a history of violations 
(three years without a citation) with OSHA. While 1 2  fatality cases had been cited for a 
violation in the past three years 
The trenching fatalities indicated that over 93% of the cases (41) were not union 
members and only 7% of the cases (3) were union members. Some unions have training 
programs available for their members, which may have influenced this total. Union 
members also have union stewards, which can stop all construction work if they deem the 
worksite as dangerous. 
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VI. Conclusions 
Unlike all previous studies, the OSHA inspector's case file report was available 
for review and data collecting. Using these files was significant in aiding in identifying 
the causative factors. The original purpose of the review of the IMIS records and case 
files was to improve the quality and causal specificity of data obtained from OSHA's 
investigations of fatal construction events. Data improvements are necessary for OSHA 
to develop and implement strategies to improve workplace safety on construction sites 
(Shriver 2002). The IMIS database is not sufficient to analyze the fatal accident's causal 
factors by it self. The case file is needed to determine all the factors, direct and indirect, 
of the accident. 
As an obvious first step in preventing such fatalities in the future, we conclude 
that all such operations should be done only in full compliance with existing OSHA 
standards (NIOSH, 1995). The findings of this investigation of fatal construction events 
suggest that fatal events, which occurred during the study period due to trench collapse, 
could have easily been prevented if a competent person onsite had followed OSHA 
regulations. In almost all trench cave-in cases, the workers in trenches were not protected 
properly by either sloped sides, trench boxes, or shoring. In some fatality cases, trench 
boxes were being used but workers would step out of the area protected by the trench box 
and would be caught by a cave-in (Hinze, 1 998). When there was not a diligent 
competent person on-site, it reflects a lack of training in the proper trenching 
requirements. For trenching operations, employees need to be trained in safety of 
trenches, their hazards, and all the regulations required by OSHA. It could be that many 
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construction companies were aware of the excavation regulations, but working safely was 
often sacrificed from ignorance of the situation, acceptance of employee risk, or schedule 
demands. The long-term financial impact of potential penalties, lawsuits, and bad 
publicity can, and in many cases should, put a contractor out of business (Johnson 1996). 
Abiding by OSHA's regulations is the key to decreasing fatalities in trenching operations. 
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VII. Comments and Recommendations 
Even with all the known dangers of trenching and the numerous violations cited 
by OSHA, it appears that employers were still taking substantial risks in trenching. So the 
question of "why" needs to be asked and addressed. Many cases reviewed show 
evidence that if the regulations had been followed there may not have been a death. 
Contractors need to be made aware of the human and monetary costs involved when they 
do not take the proper safety precautions. Additionally, they lose money due to the time 
lost for the rescue attempt, time and labor to re-excavate the trench, hefty violation fines, 
increased insurance premiums, and additional paperwork. In many cases, employers just 
didn't think it could happen to them (www.ohioline.ag.ohio-state.edu 2001). Fatal 
accidents also cost the employer money. Costs can stem from utility line damage when 
excavations fail, increased construction and insurance costs, and increased liability costs 
(Stidger, 2001). If the employer loses money then why ignore the safety standards? A 
construction company may have the added incentive to finish construction work early. 
Some companies receive large bonuses if the work was finished on schedule or before 
time. If a company received a million dollar bonus for finishing early, a $20,000 dollar 
penalty by OSHA may not be a concern. 
OSHA needs to take a stronger stance. The violation penalties do not appear to be 
high enough to force the companies into compliance. Willful and repeat violations 
should be penalized harshly. And in many criminal charges should be made on 
companies that knowingly neglect the safety regulations and especially companies that 
have repeated willful violations. 
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DATA COLLECTION FORM FOR TRENCH COLLAPSES 
CIRPC # -----
1. Deceased's work task prior to the fatal event-- Describe: 
o What the person was doing when the event occurred--What was the 
person trying to do? 
o What was the outcome? (Describe what happened) 
o What tools or equipment was he/she using? Provide nomenclature if 
tools/equipment were a direct cause. (See item 5 below.) 
o What materials (if any) were being handled by the employee? 
2. Describe physical location: 
A) Where was the deceased located within the trench? 
B) Located where relative to protective devices (was the person within a 
protected area)? 
3. Describe trench engineering controls in place (trench boxes, shoring): 
4. Describe soil/trench variables: 
o Soil type : 
o Trench configuration: dimensions, data on benching/sloping : 
o Other soil variables, such as excessive moisture: 
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5 .  Factors contributing to the incident: The following contributing factor categories 
are provided as examples of the type of information that CIRPC may look for, and 
are based upon findings from prior data reviews. Since CSHO's do not conduct 
investigations or document findings in a standardized manner across the country, 
the selection of any particular code( s) will not indicate that other factors were not 
present. Note that multiple categorizations typically WILL apply 
o Atmosphere 
o Inadequate lighting 
o Body position 
o Near open/active face of excavation without protection 
o Between trench box inner wall and installed pipe 
o Employee misconduct/attitudes 
o Bravado 
o Disregarded prior warnings (except regarding procedures-see below) 
o Disregarded prior training 
o Jumped into trench 
o Engineering/planning via process hazard analysis 
o Improperly selected trench box 
o Inadequately designed shoring 
o Material placed at edge of excavation, contributing to cave-in 
o Environment and worksite configuration 
o Deceased had to work in inappropriate area due to worksite 
configuration/area constraints 
o Ethnicity/culture/language (non-native speaker) 
o Foreman/superintendent 
o Failure to conduct job site safety walks 
o Knowledge of hazards but failure to take action 
o Lack of designated trenching "competent person" 
o Human Error 
o Failed to follow procedure 
o Maintenance related 
o Trench box or shoring design adequate; failure due to inadequate 
inspection/maintenance 
o New tasks/non-typical work 
o Employee( s) responded to unplanned event 
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o Type of project not typically performed by company 
o Task seldom performed; management did not give thought to controls 
or did not think controls were necessary for this infrequent task 
o Operator certifications/training inadequate (may not pertain to deceased, 
but to contributing operation) 
o Safety programs 
o Safety program verbal-only 
o Lack of written trenching/excavation program 
o Written programs unenforced 
o Site communication 
o Relied on other contractors/specialists to provide "safety" 
o Site management 
o Claims it intended protection but failed to provide-supplies not 
delivered etc. 
o Claims ignorance of applicable regulations 
o Felt client would not pay for proper sloping, shoring or trench box 
o Knew of requirements but did not intend to comply 
o Site scheduling 
o Pressured to move quickly 
o Training 
o No training provided regarding trenching/excavation 
hazards/precautions 
o Safety rules likely not known, based on co-worker interviews etc. 
o Trenching related: 
o Contractor failed to follow sloping specifications in work plan 
o Improper soil classification by competent person 
o No sloping/benching/shoring/trench box 
o Spoil pile within 2 feet of edge, on side of trench that collapsed 
o Trench box available but not used 
o Trench box needed greater depth (portions of trench wall fell in from 
top of box) 
o Trench box defective ( equipment failure of trench box in place) 
o Trench box in use but worker left the protected area 
o Trench box did not fit into available workspace ( e.g. needed shorter or 
narrower box); utilities crossed trench and were in the way 
o Trench box did not have bulkheads, material entered box from ends 
o Operator failed to check trench before digging ( disturbing materials 
that subsequently caved in onto employee(s)) 
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6. Whether the work activity was a direct cause, vs. adjacent activities. For example, did 
the trench collapse because the employee did something to disturb the trench wall, or 
did the operator undercut the excavation near the deceased' s location, or was there no 
distinct event? 
o Direct 
o Indirect 
o Collapse caused neither directly by deceased' s actions, nor by 
surrounding operations. Rather, by collapses/sloughing "waiting to 
happen." 
o Insufficient detail to ascertain 
7. Whether or not the fatality was the result of an engineering design/equipment failure. 
(Yes/No) 
8. If the result of an engineering design/equipment failure: 
a. Describe the failure: 
b. Answer the following: 
o Did the controls appear to have met OSHA design requirements under 
the conditions of use? Yes/No/unsure 
o Was proper maintenance conducted? Yes/No/unsure 
o Was the engineered control used in accordance with manufacturer's 
designer's recommendations? Yes/No/unsure 
o Describe variances, if any: 
9. Was the particular phase of work on-schedule? 
10. Tenure of employment on this job: 
1 1 . Time of day of event: 
Yes/No/unsure 
1 2. Employment size of parent company (enterprise) for which the deceased worked. 
(CIRPC plans to use Dunn & Bradstreet data to confirm the figures reported within 
IMIS; we presume funding for this activity.)= _____ _ 
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13. Was the deceased working for a construction contractor, or another type of employer 
engaged in force account work? Contractor/force account 
14. Was the deceased covered under a collective bargaining agreement, at the project on 
which he/she was killed? 
Yes/No/Unsure 
15. Had the employer been subject to an OSHA compliance inspection within one year 
prior to the fatal event? (CIRPC plans to obtain this data from IMIS inspection 
records.) Yes/No 
16. Describe additional information needs, for this fatality case. 
17. Describe what could have been feasibly done that may have prevented the incident. 
(Compare this project to a compliant "safer" job, with emphasis in this question on 
engineering controls, project tools/equipment and personal protective equipment.) 
18. Describe conditions that made employer perceive compliance would be difficult or 
impossible, where provided. 
19. Other information worth noting and not captured elsewhere: 
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Table C-1 : 
Cono1buting Facto1·s in Tnnch Collapses, 199'7 
Case Files 
� "' oa ao .., 0 "" � � 
N 
'O ... ... ... c:, � 
� � 
c:, 
� � � � � � � � Contributine Factors ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
A-•re 
Inad, auate li<rhtinir 
BMY PHidaa 
Between trench box inner wall. and ciile 
Near ocen/ active face of excavation with 11rot.ection X 
r.-i.- Mlsce .. w:t 
Bravado 
Di1nR;uded Drior wuniruzs (excect orocedw:H • HI below) 
Di1re11:uded flflnr traini..,,. 
Jumced into trench X 
EN.bee.;- pi.u..t-
lm.procertv ulact1d trench box 
Inadequately demm.ed 1horina: 
Material clac:ed at 1da:e of excavation. con1ributina: to cave-in X X X X 
F.mm-•t ... Werksia 
DecHHd had to work in an inappropriate arn due to winbi11 conftguration/aru 
const.raint.s 
EtJudcJ.n,/C-.ltllnlL•---e 
Non-native rp1aker X 
FereJaaJl 
F 1w11n to conduct job ,i.te nfetv walk1 X X X X X X X 
KnowiedRe ofhaard1 but fllilw:e to tak:1 action X X X 
Lack of dnumated trenchintt • comoet.ent cer1on• X X X X X X X 
Hwaax Ernr 
Fail.id to follow orocedw:1 
Malntll-• RelatBd 
Trench box or shori..,,. desi ..... adeauate 
F ail.we due to inadeauate inscect.ion/m.aintenance 
New TaslmlN'ea-T-kal Werk 
Emnlovell(s) rnconded to unnlanned event 
Type ofcroiect not typicellv perfonned bv com.canv X 
Task seldom clffonned 
M maa:,mmt did not lliv1 thouot.t to controll or di.d not think were necHsarv 
0-ratar Certlflcadea 
Operator certificat.ion/trainirur were inadeciuat11 for iob 
S-iYl'na'.ruu 
Safetv cromam. verbal-nntv X 
Lack of written trenchinwexc avation oroarem. X X X 
Written PfOIO'llffll unenforced X 
SliB Co--icadilu 
R1lied on other contractors/1cieciali1t1 to crovide • 1af1tv" 
SiiB U.-e-•t 
Clam\l i.t intended 11rotect.ion but failed to movide 
C18Ulll i""oranc, of _,.,licable remilati.ons 
Felt client would not pay for nroner 1lonin.._ 1hmuur or trench box 
Knew of Ht'IUH'ffllentl but did not intend to comnlv X X 
SitB Sc� 
Pr1111ured to move ciuicklv 
Tr-afiam 
No t.rainiruz 1:1rovide d for trenchiniz X X X X X 
Safetv rules likelv not known X X X 
Trench Re1a1e• 
Contractor failed to tollaw 1lnmmr 1e11cificalion1 in wodt cilan X 
J ....... oner ,oil clanification bv c..-... etent nerson 
No 1lmiirur/b1nchin..t1hoM• X X X X X X X X X 
Spoil iiil• within 2 net of ed.:e on 1ide oftnnch X X X X X X X 
Trench box available but not u111d X 
Trench box nHded Arnt.er iiM,tJ,, X 
Trench box dlt.ctiv1 
Trench box in UH but worker lef\ the nrotected area X 
Trench box did not fit into availablt WDfl<ffl&Ce (1hort.er or narrower) 
Trench box did not have bulkheadL material enter bOll &cm ends 
Oi:,erator failed to check trench before cti0Dffl,. 
Willfu1 violation, 
Soil type C u u u u C u C C C 
Time of day •PM tt::JCI" tt:a.i. 4::MIP 4:53,I, 1:45P 11:45 1' 1:45P IP 1:SOP 
Wet/rain/ltandiniz water X X X X 
Hot/1unnv X 
A1t1 3.5 39 31 31 30 63 .53 18 18 19 
Occui:,ation L.tlorft LMK,,.f Plumbft Labar« UDoflf L•ba•r LM10t9f L.iicrN L•bof•r Plpl'f•1•r 
State PA co AL TX OH NJ NJ NE TX TX 
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Table C-2: 
Contributing Factol"s in T1·t11cb CoDapsu, 1998 
C:ue FilH 
N .. D ... "' 0 .. ., ... "' ., "' ... "' ;: N 0 ... ... 00 ..... ... 00 .. .. D N ..... ... 00 ; 0 q q q q 
� � 
q q q q 
� � 
q q q � ; c;, ; 00 i: : : . : : i: : i: : : : Contnllu1in2 Facton "' "' "' 
Am-hen 
In1dtqu1telv lil!hlin,r 
JW,P..tdo 
Between !tench box inner wall. 111d pipe X 
Neu openfame fac, of 11t1Y1WH1 wilhaut protection X X 
r..11-Milc:onct 
Bravado 
Diu111:ardlld prior waminn (m:1nt moc1dw11 - 111 bolnw'I X X 
Diue11:ardlld mim lninirur X X 
Jump1dimo tnnch - . - . 
lnmnmed,r nlectld trmch b01 X X X 
lnadtquatalv delllllfled lhftMtl X 
Mlllerw plmd 111 ,dll:t of IICIVlliarJ, cOlllrilrutin2 to can-in X X X X 
r..in_:at ... Weruia 
Dmu,dhldto 'IPIBia millapproprilt, ... du, to workllite 
crmlmuratian/aru coml11inu 
E ' . 
Non-natiTI IPIUer 
Fmmu 
Flilure to conclurtiob lite 11f1tvwalu X X X X X X 
Knowledge ofhmrde but flilure to tab action X X X X X X X X 
Lack of deailmmd ttm.c:birur •comprhnt person• X X lC X X X X X X 
lhaaaF.nv 
Flliledto fallowprocedw1 X X 
Main--=- RalaW 
Trench box or 1hminlr dtlilm adequate 
F llilure due to inade,mal.t insorctionfmlinlenance 
New T11u/NI• T,,11:al Wirt 
Emalay1e(1) rnponded to unol11mtd rYenl 
Tv1:11 of 11roiect 00t tvvicllly pelf'oimed by CDllllllDV X 
T uk seldom paf\mned X 
M111agtm,DL did not gj-fe lhaugt&to cCllllrol, m didaat lhinkwm 
ntCHHry 
Otentlr Cmila1ila 
Operator clflilicationll11irlin2 nre inadaqullle for job X X 
S .. typ....,... 
Safrtv llfOl!l'IIII mb•onlv X X X X X 
Lack of11'ritten lnflthina/1xc1Yllion 111011r1111 X X X X X X 
Wmten mom11111 11111nforced X 
S111 C.aaaicatins 
Relied on other conlractorllsp1cilli.ns to proYide 111f1tv' 
Sm Mn.e•:at 
Claims it intended mateclion but feiled to mavida X 
Claims il!nonnce of om,licable relZUlatians X X 
Fell client would not oav for mnaer slnt>ift" shnrini, or !tench box 
Knew ofrenuinment, but didnotintmd to c1111111!v X lC X X X 
S111 Scanlla 
Pres11111d to 1110n auicklv 
Tniai-
No lninin2 aro'ridld for lr1ncliin2 X X X X X X X X X X 
Slf1tv rulu liblv not known X X lC X X 
TiuckRlllaW 
Contraclor failed to foDow l1omn2 so1cifications in woik plan X 
imlroner 1oil claniftcllion by como,tent penon X X X: X 
No 11oDi!WJb111Chinaflhmin2 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Spoil pile wilhin l fut of'e.tn on Iida of'lmlch X X X X X X 
Trmchb01 aYliltble but not used X X X X X 
Trllll:h b01needtd melter delh X X: X 
Trtnchb01 dlf1m1 
Trmch box in 1111 but warkn � lh, protec\ld 1111 X X X 
Trmch bax did not lit into available worklDICI (1horter or lllffOW� X X 
Trench b01 did not ban bulkh11d1, malaii.111 enter box frOIII end1 
Ollerlllorfailed to checkttenchbefore diHin" 
Wtllful Tiolations X X X X 
SailtvPe u u C C C C C u C C C B B u u u C B u B 
Time ofdav "°' lt4I - t'40 - lt:MI UI t::IQI, t� - t:111 •-'l lt,O � :t:IIGP - ua n:1111 4:20 l1III 
Wet/rain/llandinawalat X X X X X X X 
Hot/1111111v X 
A11 l& 41 33 JP l,C 11 38 4l 11 :29 151 ll "II jQ (2 31 2l :zg 4' 49 
Occwllion - l- ........ -....... l ..... 1a. ...... ....... ------ 1 ...... ---- L••w 
SW. PA KS PA AR WI 0A MA NY NE. NJ OH MO SD TX TX NY AL AL TX TX 
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Table C-3: 
Contiibudng Factors bl Tl'f"ncll Collapses, 1999 
� DO � .,., � � :!; ;::; \C) C> .,., � 
� � � � � � � 
..;I' 
Co11tJ.ib11til12 Facton 0, 0, 0, � � 
ADIIIHJDU:n 
InadeQuate lia:htinR: 
eo•v Pesidon 
BetwHn trench boll innar wall, end c,i,:,e 
Neu oc,en/active face of excavation with c,rotect.ion X X 
F.-:a.-e Misconduct 
Bravado X 
Diare11:uded Drier wmnm.11:a (ellce,:,t oroceduns - 11111111 below) 
Dierear:ude d c,rior trairunR: I 
]llffl"'llld into trench X X 
F..u.inae:rhl. piammu, 
Imorooerlv selectlld trench box X X 
Inad11QUatelv delli...,.ed 1hnrinJ,,, 
Materiel olac11d at edar:e of excavation. cantributinar: to cav11-in X X X 
EariroJU11111nt au Worksite 
D11cea111d had to work in en inappropriat11 area due to worksite 
confillW'at.ion/u11a constninta X 
Etluddtv/C111tu-eJL,.......e 
Nan-native aoeaker X X 
Fo:n-
Failure to conduct iob me 111f11tv wall!:• 
Knowieda:e ofhazarda but failure to take act.ion X X 
Lack of deai1mated trenchinl> • co,n.,,et.eni oers on" X X X X X 
Hmnan Ernr 
Failed to follow orocedure 
Mabtanance Relam• 
Trench box or 1horin11: deaiim adeouate 
Failure due to inadeQuate inftlection/meintenance 
New TukslNox-Twical Werk 
Emolovee{1) reaoonded to =lanned event 
TVlle oforoiect. not. tVllicallv aerform11d bv comoenv 
Task seldom oerformed 
Management di.d not give thought to ccmuol1 or did not think were 
nece1auv 
0-ramr Cerd&atlaa 
Operator certificat.ion/trarun2 were ine.d11auat11 for iob 
Sajety Pna:--
Se.f11tv ,:iroRJam v11rbe.l-onlv X 
Le.ck of written tnnchinR/11xcave.ti0n arol!l'am X X 
Written oroanm• un11nforc1d 
Sie Ce-1Udcado-
Relied an oth11r conkactora/1c,ecieli1ta to orovide " ae.fetv• 
Site u..--e-•t 
Cleim• it intended orotect.ion but failed to arovide X 
Cleimai iimorance of analicdlle reoru.lat.ion1 X 
Felt cli11nt would not c,av for aroaer al01:1in11L aho,.;..,.,. or trench box 
Knew of r110uirement1 but di.d not intend to c omi,lv 
Site ScllN.U.. 
PrHsured to move auicklv 
T.-ahahw 
No trainimz ,::,rovided for tnnchine: X X X X X X X X 
S afetv rule• lilcelv not known X 
T:n..:Ja Re-.1e• 
Contractor failed to follow slomn" 1siecifice.t.ions in work olen X X 
Imorooer soil cla1mficat.ion bv com11et11nt i:,enon X 
No 1l01:1in .. i..ench;".,./shorin2 X X X X X X 
Sc, oil i:,ile within ::Z feet of edir:11. on side of tr11nch X X X X X 
Trench box available but not uaed 
Trench box neaded l!l'ee.ter death X 
Trench box defective 
Trench box in un but worker lef\ the orotected uee. X 
Trench box di.d not fit into available wodcsaace (shorter or ne.rrower'I X X 
Trench box did not hav11 bulkheads. materiel enter box from ends 
�•rat.or failed to check uench before rliaoina 
Willf'ul ,,;,olations X X 
Soiltvae C u C u u B u C C 
Time of dav 3:00 1 :30 B:15 ::Z :00 6:115 10 :30 51:30 10 :00 1 :40 
Wet/rain/ate.n.dttur water X X X X 
Hot/sunnv 
AKe 18 46 24 44 ::Z5l 2 1  37 251 40 
Occuoat.ion Pllnnt..r DD•r�tor L:aborer PID•lavw LWor•r Laborer L11bor,1r L11b•rar Laborer 
State co NJ TX SD GA TX TX MO TX 
63 
Appendix D 
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U. S. Department of J �bor . . 
Occupational Safety and, ·. h Administration 
lnv�n .Summary 
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OSHA-170prinl(Jtcv. 1 1193) 
CONSTRUcnoN ACCIDENT INFORMATION 
Project Level Information 
Type of Coastruc:tion 
End-use Type of Cousauctioo Sire 
If a buildina site, DWDber of stories (in feet): 
If a DOil-building stJucture. heigm (in feet) 
Project Cost 
lnvestiption Nr. 
OSHA-l70print(Rn. 1 1193) 
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U.S. Oepartment of Labor 
Occupational Safety and Dealt' 
Inspection Report 
oistration 
:1.��N.at}���;��{t.\� .. �i�����;r�:r��::\����F��j�:�:t�7?\��:���;r:�:��f�:}.����:� ·;·�·: 
lt;i::L 
1.,�01f��., . .  
Secpe·o . . .  �· 
67 
Mail .. 
FAX : }  
·� 
OSHA·l(Rev. 6/93) 
U. S. Department of Labor 
Occupational Safety and Health . Jnistration 
Fatality/Catastrophe Report 
OSHA-36 lRn. 2196) 
68 
"'.-,. Ut::JJ*'UDeAl 01 LaU>or 
OccupaUoul Safecy and Health 
Inspection Narrative 
OSHA-lA(Rev. 6193) 
69 
U. S. Department of Lahor 
Occupational Safety and ff( ·Administration 
Worksheet 
20. Instance Description - De&cribe the following 
a) Hazards-Operation/Condition 
b) E.qulpmcnt 
c) l.A>calioa 
d) lnjury/lllncu 
e) McuuremeolS 
/;. 
OSHA-1B/IBIHpriDI�. 9/93) 
70 
23. Employer Knowledge : 
24. Comments (Employer. Employee. Closina Conference) 
25. Od1cr Employer Information : 
OSHA-1B/IBIHprilll(Rev, 919Jj 
7 1  
U.S .. Department of Labor 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
To: lmpectlon Number: 
Inspection Date(s): 
Issuance Date: 
lmpedion Site: 
This Citation and Notification of Penalty (this Citation) describes violations of the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act of 1970. The penalty(ies) listed herein is (arc) based on these violations. You must abate the violations 
referred to in this Citation by the dates listed and pay the penalties proposed� unless within IS WOtking days 
(excluding weekends and Federaq10Iidays) from your receipt of this Citation and Notification of Penalty you mail 
a notice of contest to the U.S. �cnt of Labor Area Office at the address shown above. Please refer to ·the 
enclosed booklet (OSHA 3000) which outlines your rights and responsibililies and which should be read in 
conjunction with this fonn. lsslJaDU\of this Citation doe.s not comtitute a findin, that a violatlo� of the Act has 
occurred unless there is a failure to -tontcat as provided for in the Act or, if contested, unless this Citation is 
affinned by the Review Commission or a court. 
Posting - The law-tequires that a copy of this Citation and Notification of Penalty be posted immediately in a 
prominent place,a, or near the location of the violation(a) cited herein, or , if it is not practicable because of the 
nature of the. dnployer•, operations, where it will be readily observable by all affected employees. This Citation 
must rc;mdh posted until the violation(s) cited herein bas (have) been abated, or for 3 working days (excluding 
weekends and Federal holidays), whichever is longer. The penalty dollar amounts need not be posted and may 
be marked out or covered up prior to posting. 
Informal Conference • An informal conference is not required. However, if you wish to have such a· 
conference you may requeat one with the Area Director during � 15 working day contest period. During auch· 
an informal conference you may present any evidence or views which you believe would support an adjustment 
to the citation(s) and/or pcnalty(ics). 
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If you are considering a request for an infonnal confema to discuss any issues related to this Citation and 
Notification of Penalty 9 you must take care to schedule it early euough to allow time to contest after the informal 
conference, should you decide lo do so. Pleaae keep in mind chat a written letter of intent to contesC nwst be 
submitted to the Area Director within 15 working days of your receipt of du; Citation. The nmnins of this contest 
period is not interrupted by an informal oonference. 
If you decide to reque.,t an informal conference, caJI this office between 7:30 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. for an 
appoiotment, then complete, remove and poet 1he page 4 Notice to Employees next to this Citation and Notification 
of Penalty as soon as the time, date, and place of the informal conference have been determined. Be sure to bring 
Lo the conference any and all supporting documentation of existing conditiODI u well as any abatement steps taken 
thus far. If conditions warrant, we can enter into an inronnal settlement agreement which amicably resolves th.u 
matter without litigation or conte&t. 
Right to Contest - You have the righc to contest this Citation and Notification of Penalty. You.may contest 
all citacioo items or only individual items. You may also contest proposed penaltiea and/or abatement dates without 
contesting the underlying violations. tJnlm you jp[orm the Ara Dfredor In fflitiPI that you intmd to contest 
the dtation(s) yd/or proposed JnPJtv«nl within 15 wnrkipg dan after nqipt. the citationOO apd the 
propecl pmalty(Jes) will becoge a flpaJ onJer or the Occupatiopal Sarety and Health Renew Comrnpno. 
and may pot be reviewed by any court or agency. 
Penalty Payment - Penalties are. due within 15 working days of receipt of this notification unless contested. 
(See the enclosed booklet and the additional information provided related to the Debt Collection Act of 1982.) 
Make your check or money order payable to "DOL-OSHA •. Please indicate the Inspection Number on the 
remittance. 
OSHA does not agree to any restrictions or r.onditions or endorsements put on any check or money order for Jess 
tban the fulJ amount due, and will cash the check or money order as if these restrictions, conditions, or 
endorsements do not exist. 
Notiracation of CorTectlve Action - For violations which you do not contest, you should notify the U.S. 
Deparcment of Labor Ami. Office promptly by letter that you have taken appropriate corrective action within the 
time frame set forth on drll Citation. Please inform the Area Office in writing of the abatement' steps you have 
taken and of their data, together with adequate supporting documentation, e.g . •  drawings or photographs of 
corrected conditions, purchase/work orders related to abatement actions, air samplin, results, etc. Attached is a 
flll-in-t.hc-blank form Jetter for your use to assist you in meeting this requirement. 
Employer Discrimination Unlawful - The law prohibits discrimination by an employer against an employee 
for filing a <:Otq>laiol or for exercising any rights under this Act. An employee who believes that be/she has been 
discriminated against may file a coq,laint no later than 30 days after the discrimination occurr� with the U.S. 
Departmcot of Labor Arca Office at the address shown above. 
Employer Rights and Responsibilities - The enclosed booklet (OSHA 3000) outlines additional employer 
rights and responsibilities and should be read in conjunction with tMs notification. 
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Nod� to Employees - The law gives an employee or his/her representative the opportumty to object to any 
abatement date set for a violation if he/she believes the date to be unreasonable. The contest must be mailed to 
the U.S. Department of Labor Area Office at the address shown above and pos1marked within 15 worltine days 
(excluding weekends and Federal holidays) of the receipt by the employer of this Citation and Notification of 
Penalty. 
Abatement Methods - The empJoycr is not limited to ·abatement medlods suggested by OSHA; i.e. methods 
explainod ue geocral and may not be effective in all cases. Other methods of abatement may be equally or more 
appropriate. Ultimate responsibility for determining the most appropriate abatement method re.sll with the 
employer, given its superior knowledge of the spt.Cific conditions at its worksite. 
Inspection Actbity Data - You should be aware tbat OSHA publishes information on its inspection and ciwion 
activity on the Internet under the provisiom of the Elec&ronic Freedom of Information Ad. The information related 
to your inspection will be available 30 calendar days after the Citation Issuance Date. You arc encouraged to 
review the infonnarion concerning your establishment at WWW.OSHA.GOV. Jf you have any dispute with the 
accuracy of the information displayed, please contact this office. 
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U.S. Department of Labor 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES OF INFORMAL CONFERENCE 
An infonnal conference has been scheduled with OSHA to discuss the citation(s) issued on 
The · conference will be held at the OSHA office located at 
on _____ at ____ _ 
Employees and/or representatives of employees have a right to attend an infonnal conference. 
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U.S. Department of Labor 
OccupldonaJ Safety and Health Administration 
Citation and NQtiffcation or PmaJty 
Company Name: 
lmpecdon Site: 
lmpedloa Nmnber: 
lmpedloa»am: 
Issuance Date: 
The alleged violatiom below have been grouped because they involve similar or related hazards that may 
increase the potential for illness. 
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U.S. Department of Labor 
Occupational Safecy and Health Administration 
Ciqtion and NQtifkatiop of Penalty 
CGIIIPIDY Name: 
lmpedioll Site: 
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lmpec:tioa Number: 
Impec:tionl>atea: 
Issuam:e Date: �� 
�I, � .. , .. ., 
Area Director 
Page 6 of OSHA-l (Rev. 9193) 
U.S. Department of Labor 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
INVOICE/ 
C...,.., Nw  
lmpedloa Slte:  
, ......... n.te: 
DEBT COLLECTION NOTICE 
To avoid additional charges, please remit payment promptly to this Area Office for che total amount of. the 
uncontested pem!tics summarized above. Make your check or money order payable to: 
·ooL-OSHA". Please indicate OSHA'� lnspection Number (indicated above) on the remittance. 
OSHA does not agree to any restrictions or conditions or endorsements put on any check or money order for less 
than fuJI amount due, and will cub lhe cbcck or money order as if these restrlctiom, conditions, or endoncmem 
do not exist. 
Pursuant to the Debt Collection Act of 1982 (Public Law 97-365) and rcplations of the U.S. Department of Labor 
(29 CFR Part 20), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration is required to assess interest, delinquent 
cbuJes, and administrative costs for the collection of delinquent penalty debt, for violations of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act. 
lalciD:lt- Interest charaes will be assCNed at an annual rate determined by the Secrccary of the Treasury on an 
penalty debt amounts not paid within one month (30 calendar daya) of the date on wbJch the debt amount becomes 
due and payable (penalty due cbte). The current interest rate is S�. !merest will accrue from the date on which 
the penalty amounts (u proposed or adjusted) become a final order of the OccupatioDa1 Safely and Heakb Review 
Comminioo (that ii, 15 working days from your receipt of the Citation and Notification of Penalty). unless you 
file a notice of contest. Interest charges will be waived if the full amount owed is paid within 30 calendar days 
of the final order. 
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Vita 
John Patrick Wagner was born in Chicago, Illinois on March 28, 1975. He 
was raised in Oak Ridge, Tennessee and went to St. Mary's Catholic School and 
then Oak Ridge High School. He graduated with Honors in 1993. From there, he 
went to Roane State Community College where he received an Associates of 
Science in 1996. He then attended University of Tennessee and received his 
Bachelors of Science in Industrial Engineering in 1998 and Masters of Science in 
Industry Engineering in 2004. 
John is currently working for Construction Industry Research and Policy 
Center as an Engineering Research Associate and enjoys bowling and playing 
softball. 
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